1992–2002: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR WAR

2003: THE WAR AND THE LEAK

2003–2006: THE INVESTIGATION

1992–2002: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR WAR

1992
I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby guides the production of the first Defense Planning Guidance document drafted after the end of the Cold War. It calls for 
preventing any country from growing strong enough to rival the United States. It is considered the first expression of neoconservative policy and is one reason behind Dick Cheney’s respect for Scooter Libby.

August 1995
Saddam Hussein’s brother-in-law Hussein Kamel defects to Jordan and reveals full extent of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, but tells U.S. and international weapons inspectors that Iraq destroyed them all.

January 24, 1998
Weapons inspector Scott Ritter briefs Iraqi defector Ahmed Chalabi on UN weapons inspectors’ expectations in Iraq. Ritter provided Chalabi a detailed description of inspectors’ suspicions about mobile bioweapons labs (MBLs).

January 26, 1998
Members of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a group closely tied to the hawkish neoconservative movement, send President Bill Clinton a letter urging him to support a policy for regime change in Iraq. Signatories to the letter include:

• Elliott Abrams, who would become George W. Bush’s top Middle East advisor and later his deputy national security advisor
• Richard Armitage, who would serve as deputy secretary of state under Colin Powell
  
• John Bolton, future undersecretary of state and UN ambassador
• Pentagon advisor Richard Perle
• Donald Rumsfeld, who would become Bush’s secretary of defense
• Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense under Rumsfeld 
and later president of the World Bank
• Pentagon advisor James Woolsey
Almost all of these PNAC members pushed the Bush administration 
to adopt a hawkish policy on Iraq.

August 15, 1998
Judith Miller, with James Risen, publishes a story in The New York Times on Khidir Hamza, an expatriate Iraqi nuclear scientist connected to Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. Hamza claimed Iraq could develop a bomb a year or two after inspectors withdrew and sanctions ended. He is later discredited as a fraud.

October 31, 1998
The Iraq Liberation Act is signed into law. The law sets aside $97 million to support opposition groups in hopes of effecting a Democratic transition in Iraq. It makes “regime change” the official policy of the U.S. and starts the policy of funding the defectors who would provide dodgy intelligence to justify the war.

December 1998
UN weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) withdraw from Iraq to prepare for U.S. bombing campaign on Iraq. After the withdrawal of inspectors, the U.S. loses much of its ability to collect intelligence on Iraq.

1999
Joe Wilson conducts trip for the CIA to learn whether Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan attempted to acquire uranium from Niger.

February 1999
Iraq’s ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam al-Zahawie, visits Niger to invite the Nigerien president to visit Iraq. It would later be alleged that this visit pertained to arranging a uranium deal.

Spring 1999
Retired ambassador Joe Wilson coaches members of Niger’s military 
government to help their transition to civilian rule.

November 1999
Iraqi defector “Curveball” arrives in Germany, telling stories about his 
personal involvement with MBLs.

February 2000
Antonio Nucera of SISMI, the Italian intelligence agency, introduces con man Martino Rocco to SISMI source La Signora. The meeting would lead to the production and circulation of forgeries alleging an Iraq-Niger 
uranium deal.

March 2000
A Defense Intelligence Agency medical technician first raises concerns about Curveball, believing him to be an alcoholic.

January 2, 2001
A break-in is reported at the Nigerien Embassy in Rome. The thieves may have provided cover for the SISMI agents producing the Niger forgeries; they may also have collected materials in the production of those forgeries.

January 30, 2001
At his first National Security Council meeting, President George W. Bush makes regime change in Iraq a top security policy. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld promises to examine military options; CIA Director George Tenet commits to improving intelligence on Iraq.

February 24, 2001
Secretary of State Colin Powell asserts that the sanctions regime 
against Saddam has worked—he has not developed any significant 
WMD capabilities.

March 2001
The Information Collection Program, a propaganda and intelligence 
program, authorizes the Iraqi National Congress to provide 
information to the U.S. about Saddam Hussein’s regime. Under this 
program, the INC connected defectors—some of them fabricators—
with U.S. intelligence agencies.

April 10, 2001
The first CIA analysis on Iraq’s aluminum tubes determines they are intended for uranium enrichment.

May 2001
The Department of Energy (DOE) explains that the aluminum tubes almost exactly match known Iraqi rocket casings.

June 2001
CIA operatives—including Valerie Plame Wilson—work with Jordan to intercept a shipment of aluminum tubes.

July 2001
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agrees with DOE’s judgment that the aluminum tubes are intended for a conventional rocket program.

September 20, 2001
President Bush first raises the prospect of war on Iraq with British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

October 2001
Creation of the Counter-Terrorism Evaluation Group, a parallel intelligence organization developing the argument supporting the hawks’ case for war, under Cheney ally David Wurmser. The group evolves into the Office of Special Plans.

October 15, 2001
The first SISMI report on Nigerien uranium is sent to CIA.

December 20, 2001
Judith Miller publishes a story on INC defector Adnan Haideri, who claims Iraq had renewed its interest in nuclear weapons.

January 29, 2002
President Bush names Iraq as part of the “Axis of Evil.”

February 2002
Senator Bob Graham learns that military resources are being pulled out of Afghanistan to prepare for war against Iraq.

February 5, 2002
SISMI shares a second report on Nigerien uranium. This report would spark Vice President Cheney to ask for more information on the Nigerien uranium allegations, which would lead to Joe Wilson’s Niger trip.

February 19, 2002
A meeting is held at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to determine whether Joe Wilson can help determine the accuracy of the Nigerien 
uranium claim. Valerie Wilson introduces her husband. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analyst Douglas Rohn takes notes—
inaccurate notes—that will form the INR memo.

March 25, 2002
Third SISMI report on Nigerien uranium.

March 2002
Dick Cheney tells Republican senators that the U.S. will go to war 
against Iraq.

June 2002
Cheney and his national security advisor, Scooter Libby, make 
unprecedented trips to CIA to pressure analysts.

June 1, 2002
Bush announces a new policy of preemptive war.

July 23, 2002
The “Downing Street memo” is written by British foreign secretary Jack Straw. It states that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" and forecasts that the campaign to build support for war to begin a month before congressional elections.

August 2002
The Office of Special Plans is founded, to cull raw intelligence reports and develop talking points to support the war.

White House chief of staff Andrew Card founds the White House Iraq Group to build support for war. Its members include Karl Rove, Karen Hughes,

Mary Matalin, Scooter Libby, and Condoleezza Rice. WHIG’s July 2003 papers would be subpoenaed in the CIA leak investigation.

August 26, 2002
Cheney gives a speech that has not been vetted by the CIA, nor approved by Bush. In it, he declares, “There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.” The speech forces the administration to adopt a confrontational stance even sooner than the White House had 
planned on doing.

September 2002
CIA’s head of operations for Europe, Tyler Drumheller, learns the Germans believe Curveball may be a fabricator and may have psychological problems.

September 5, 2002
Senator Bob Graham of Florida, head of the Senate Intelligence Committee, learns the Bush administration has not planned to produce a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. Graham requests one.

September 8, 2002
New York Times reporters Michael Gordon and Judith Miller write an article describing Iraqi attempts to acquire aluminum tubes, supposedly for a uranium enrichment program. On the same day, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld appear on Sunday morning talk shows to make the case for war. Rice, Rumsfeld, and the New York Times article all use the phrase “mushroom cloud” to describe the threat of an Iraqi nuclear program.

September 12, 2002
Bush’s speech to the UN calls for a resolution against Iraq and 
weapons inspectors.

September 24, 2002
A British white paper on the threat from Iraq is released. This was the first public mention of the Nigerien uranium allegation. The dossier would later be described as “sexed up.”

October 1, 2002
The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, the intelligence community’s best summary of what it knows about Iraq, is published. Cheney gives Bush a one-page summary, including details of the debate about the 
aluminum tubes.

October 4–6, 2002
CIA sends the National Security Council repeated warnings against Niger uranium claims.

October 7, 2002
CIA refuses to allow President Bush to use Niger claims in a speech 
in Cincinnati.

October 9, 2002
Italian journalist Elisabetta Burba receives forged documents alleging 
an Iraq-Niger uranium deal. She vets them with the U.S. Embassy, from which they are eventually forwarded to Cheney ally John Bolton at Department of State.

October 11, 2002
The Iraq War resolution is approved by the U.S. Congress.

October 15, 2002
A State Department INR analyst debunks the uranium documents.

November 27, 2002
Weapons inspectors return to Iraq.

December 2002
CIA’s Berlin station chief warns George Tenet that Curveball may 
be unreliable.

December 19, 2002
A fact sheet drafted in John Bolton’s department repeats the Niger 
allegation. This is the first public mention of an alleged sale of Nigerien uranium to Iraq.



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2003: THE WAR AND THE LEAK

January 2003
The top intelligence officer for Africa warns the Bush administration that the Nigerien uranium claim is without merit.

January 9, 2003
Mohamed El Baradei, head of the IAEA, reports to the UN that the Iraqi aluminum tubes are intended for conventional rockets.

January 28, 2003
Bush gives his State of the Union speech, in which he utters the famous sixteen words.

February 4, 2003
When asked to provide additional reasons (beyond the Italian forgeries) to the IAEA for concern about the Niger allegations, the U.S. mentions the CIA report from Joe Wilson’s trip. This was the first time any intelligence agency used the report to support the allegations that Iraq was attempting to acquire uranium.

February 5, 2003
Secretary of State Colin Powell addresses the UN, making the case for war. Powell does not mention the Niger allegation, though he does use the aluminum tubes and MBLs to defend the war.

February 9, 2003
The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) searches Curveball’s former worksite and determines his claims about MBLs to be false.

March 7, 2003
IAEA announces that the documents on which the Nigerien uranium claim is based are crude forgeries. They informed the administration of this four days earlier, on March 3.

March 8, 2003
On CNN, Joe Wilson suggests the administration knew the Niger claims were wrong. On the same day, the DIA again uses the report on Wilson’s trip to support allegations that Iraq sought uranium.

March 16, 2003
Dick Cheney claims, “We believe [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.”

March 19, 2003
Iraq War begins.

March 25, 2003
Bush issues an executive order giving the vice president the power 
to declassify information. This act provides the legal justification for 
later claims that Cheney authorized the leak of the National 
Intelligence Estimate.

April 5, 2003
Judith Miller reveals a source’s name, even though the source had not spoken for attribution.

April 21, 2003
First “Yankee Fan” article in the Times provides explanation for the absence of WMDs: The weapons had been destroyed.

April 24, 2003
Second “Yankee Fan” article.

May 1, 2003
Bush declares “the United States…has prevailed” in front of banner declaring MISSION ACCOMPLISHED.

Judith Miller preempts a colleague’s profile of Ahmed Chalabi by publishing her own. In the profile, she quotes an anonymous source insinuating that one Chalabi ally was a CIA asset.

New York Times reporter Jayson Blair resigns after it is discovered he 
fabricated or plagiarized many of his stories. The ensuing scrutiny leads to the resignation of editors who had encouraged Miller’s prewar reporting and brings her own reporting under scrutiny.

May 6, 2003
Nicholas Kristof publishes a column in the Times describing Joe Wilson’s allegations. In response, Cheney’s office begins to collect information 
on Wilson.

May 7, 2003
Judith Miller publishes her first Mukhabarat article, “finding”
a uranium document.

May 8, 2003
Miller publishes first of four mobile bioweapons lab articles, admitting some doubts.

May 9, 2003
Miller publishes a second Mukhabarat article, reporting that most of what was found earlier has disappeared.

May 11, 2003
Miller publishes a second MBL article.

May 15, 2003
A Times spokesperson announces the paper will look at reporters besides Blair whose work is questionable.

May 16, 2003
CIA publishes a white paper on MBL. The paper dismisses Iraq’s hydrogen balloons explanation as “denial and deception” and doesn’t admit several discrepancies with the trailers.

May 19, 2003
The MBL white paper is briefed to the White House.

May 21, 2003
Judith Miller publishes a third MBL article (with William Broad), asserting that the trailers are definitely MBLs. The article relies on the still-classified white paper and preempts the investigation of the Jefferson Project, an international team of weapons inspectors.

May 27, 2003
The Jefferson Project determines the trailers are not MBLs, and so informs CIA in an e-mailed executive summary.

May 28, 2003
CIA’s MBL white paper is declassified.

May 29, 2003
Bush claims that Coalition forces have found WMD, based on the 
MBL claims.

Cheney’s office seeks information on Joe Wilson from 
the State Department.

June 8, 2003
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice claims no one at her level knew the Niger intelligence to be bad. Joe Wilson tries to contact her via an intermediary to correct this claim, but to no avail. This incident prompts Wilson to write his July 6 op-ed.

June 10, 2003
The first “INR memo” details the State Department’s stance on the Niger allegations. It mentions Valerie Wilson’s CIA affiliation.

June 12, 2003
Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus publishes an article describing Joe Wilson’s allegations. On the same day, Cheney tells Libby that Valerie Wilson works in the counterproliferation department at CIA.

June 13, 2003
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of Valerie Wilson’s involvement in WMD at CIA.

June 17, 2003
CIA concludes the Niger claims are incorrect. Cheney is briefed that the CIA has withdrawn its uranium claim.

June 19, 2003
The New Republic publishes an article detailing prewar intelligence 
problems. It is the third article mentioning Joe Wilson discussed in Cheney’s office.

June 23, 2003
Scooter Libby and Judith Miller meet in Libby’s office. Libby suggests that Valerie Wilson may work at the CIA.

June 27, 2003
Libby and Bob Woodward meet in Libby’s office; Libby leaks details of the NIE.

July 6, 2003
Joe Wilson publishes his op-ed in The New York Times, concluding that the Bush administration purposefully manipulated intelligence in order to win support for the war.

July 7, 2003
Scooter Libby tells White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer that Valerie Wilson works at the CIA.

The second “INR memo,” this time addressed to Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman, Armitage, Powell, and State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher. Armitage would have it faxed to Colin Powell.

July 8, 2003
Meeting between Scooter Libby and Judith Miller at St. Regis Hotel. Libby leaked the NIE, the report from Wilson’s trip, and (according to Miller) Valerie Wilson’s role at the CIA. Libby also insinuated that Joe Wilson had an earlier liaison role between Iraq and Niger.

Possible conversation between presidential advisor Karl Rove and 
conservative Robert Novak about Valerie Wilson.

Robert Novak tells a complete stranger that Valerie Wilson works at the CIA on WMD.

Robert Novak and Richard Armitage meet in Armitage’s office. Armitage tells Novak that Valerie Wilson works at the CIA on WMD.

July 9, 2003
Possible Karl Rove and Robert Novak conversation.

July 10, 2003
Joe Wilson calls Novak about the leak of Valerie Wilson’s identity; 
Novak asks Wilson to confirm the report.

Libby complains to Tim Russert of NBC News about Chris Matthews’s 
coverage of the Niger allegations. Libby later claims that Russert leaked Valerie Wilson’s identity during this conversation.

July 10 or 11, 2003
Libby and Rove discuss Rove’s conversation with Novak. Rove informs Libby that Novak will publish a story on Joe Wilson’s wife.

July 11, 2003
Rove speaks with Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper. He reveals that Valerie Wilson works at the CIA on WMD.

George Tenet accepts partial responsibility for Niger allegation being in the State of the Union speech.

July 12, 2003
Libby and Dick Cheney fly to Virginia on Air Force 2. They strategize on how to respond to Wilson.

Libby talks with Cooper and confirms Valerie Wilson’s employment 
at the CIA.

Two Libby conversations with Miller.
Libby talks with Washington Post reporter Glenn Kessler. According to

Kessler, they didn’t discuss Valerie Wilson.
Senior administration official informs Walter Pincus that Valerie Wilson works at the CIA on WMD.

July 14, 2003
Novak column reveals that Valerie Wilson is a “operative” on WMD 
and claims she sent her husband to Niger to examine allegations of 
an Iraq-Niger uranium deal.

July 16, 2003
Journalist David Corn asks whether Novak’s column amounts to a violation of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA).

July 18, 2003
The NIE on Iraq is declassified. The White House’s director of communications, Dan Bartlett, gives more details in a background briefing.

July 20, 2003
NBC reporter Andrea Mitchell tells Wilson that the White House has informed her that Valerie Wilson is the story, not Wilson’s own allegations that the administration manipulated intelligence to make a case for war.

July 21, 2003
MSNBC reporter Chris Matthews tells Joe Wilson that Karl Rove told him Valerie Wilson was “fair game.”

July 22, 2003
Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Director of Communications Dan Bartlett admit being warned by the CIA about the 
Niger claims in October 2002.

An article in Newsday by Tim Phelps and Knut Royce confirms Valerie Wilson’s covert identity and quotes Novak as claiming his sources “came to him and gave him the name.”

Late July 2003
A CIA officer explains to Scooter Libby the danger of revealing Valerie Wilson’s identity.

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2003–2006: THE INVESTIGATION

September 26, 2003
The Department of Justice announces an investigation into CIA leak.

September 28, 2003
A Washington Post article (known as the 1x2x6 article) strongly suggests that the leak of Valerie Wilson’s identity was intentional.

September 29, 2003

Robert Novak and Karl Rove have a conversation about the investigation.

October 1, 2003

Novak publishes his “partisan gunslinger” column (the October 6 version uses the name “Flame” instead of “Plame”), backing off from his story of receiving an intentional leak.

October 2, 2003
FBI interviews Richard Armitage.

October 4, 2003
Novak reveals that Valerie Wilson used her CIA cover company, 
Brewster & Jennings, on FEC records.

October 7, 2003
FBI interviews Novak.
Bush publicly doubts that the leaker will be found.

October 12, 2003
The Washington Post’s Mike Allen reiterates 1x2x6; the article (written 
with Walter Pincus) reveals that the Post also received the leak.

October 14, 2003
FBI first interviews Libby.

December 30, 2003
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft recuses himself. Deputy Attorney General James Comey appoints Patrick Fitzgerald as special counsel to investigate the CIA leak.

January 14, 2004
Novak is interviewed at his lawyer’s office.

February 2004
Karl Rove testifies twice before the grand jury.

March 5, 2004
Libby testifies before the grand jury.

March 24, 2004
Libby testifies again before the grand jury.

June 2, 2004
George W. Bush seeks private counsel.

June 5, 2004
The Washington Post confirms Fitzgerald has already interviewed Cheney.

June 24, 2004
Fitzgerald interviews Bush.

August 23, 2004
Cooper testifies, revealing that Libby was not his first source for the information that Valerie Wilson worked at the CIA. According to Cooper, Fitzgerald was surprised by the information.

September 13, 2004
Fitzgerald issues a more general subpoena to Matt Cooper. This is the sole subpoena in the case requiring a journalist to reveal details about an unnamed source.

October 7, 2004
Cooper’s attempt to quash the subpoena is denied. Rove only turns over the e-mail indicating he might be Cooper’s source after Cooper’s subpoena is quashed, when he testifies on October 15.

October 15, 2004
Rove testifies a third time. He admits he may have spoken with Cooper.

July 6, 2005
Cooper works out a last-minute agreement to testify after Rove’s lawyer claims Cooper is not protecting Rove.
Miller sent to jail for contempt of court.

July 13, 2005
Cooper testifies and reveals that his source was Karl Rove.

July 14, 2005
Democrats call on Bush to fulfill his promise to fire anyone involved in 
the CIA leak.

July 15, 2005
Stories casting suspicion on Ari Fleischer first appear. The stories would retain credence right up until the week of Libby’s indictment.

September 15, 2005
Libby writes the “Aspen” letter to Miller, encouraging her to testify.

September 29, 2005
Miller agrees to testify and is released from jail.

September 30, 2005
Miller testifies.

October 12, 2005
Miller testifies a second time, about her June 23 meeting with Libby.

October 14, 2005
Rove testifies a fourth time.

October 28, 2005
Libby is indicted on five charges: two of false statements, one of obstruction, and two of perjury.

November 14, 2005
Bob Woodward gives a deposition about an early leak from 
Richard Armitage.

December 8, 2005
Time magazine reporter Viveca Novak gives a deposition about contacts with Robert Luskin, lawyer for Karl Rove.

February 2006
Armitage is informed he will not be charged.

April 26, 2006
Rove testifies for a fifth time before the grand jury.

June 13, 2006
Rove is informed he will not be charged.

July 2006
Joe and Valerie Wilson file civil suit against Cheney, Libby, Rove, and ten “John Does.” They will later add Armitage.

January 16, 2007
Scheduled start of jury selection for Libby trial.

© 2007 Marcy Wheeler

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